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The paper reviews the existing cost-sharing practices in four Central European countries 
namely the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia focusing on patient co-payments 
for pharmaceuticals and services covered by the social health insurance. The aim is to 
examine the role of cost-sharing arrangements and to evaluate them in terms of efficiency, 
equity and public acceptance to support policy making on patient payments in Central Europe. 
Our results suggest that the share of out-of-pocket payments in total health care expenditure is 
relatively high (24-27%) in the countries examined. The main driver of these payments is the 
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expenditure on pharmaceuticals and medical devices, which share exceeds 70% of the 
household expenditure on health care. The four countries use similar cost-sharing techniques 
for pharmaceuticals, however there are differences concerning the measure of exemption 
mechanisms for vulnerable social groups. Patient payment policies for health care services 
covered by the social health insurance are also converging. All the four countries apply co-
payments for dental care, some hotel services or in the case of free choice of physician. Also 
the countries (except for Poland) tried to extend co-payments for physician services and 
hospital care. However, their introduction met strong political opposition and unpopularity 
among public.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The paper is focusing on the issue of patient cost-sharing in health care in four Central 
European Countries often called “the Visegrád group”, namely the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovakia. These countries have been facing similar challenges during the last 
decades concerning the transition of the health care systems, the continuous financial 
problems of the health insurance funds (Bryndova et al. 2009; Hlavačka et al. 2004; 
Kuszewski – Gericke 2005; Rechel – McKee 2009). To deal with these problems all the four 
countries apply some kind of cost-sharing to control public spending in health care financing. 
These payments in a broader context include all types of direct payments that health care 
consumers make when using health care services or when purchasing health care commodities 
(e.g. pharmaceuticals and medical devices).  
In the examined Central European countries cost-sharing for pharmaceuticals and 
medical devices have long been applied and constitute a notable share of total health 
expenditure (Baji et al. 2011a; Rechel – McKee 2009; Tambor et al. 2010). On the other hand 
the share of cost-sharing for health care services covered by social health insurance remained 
minor. However, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic attempted to introduce co-
payments for health care services with the objective of controlling public health care 
expenditure on the macro level through the control of the utilization of health care services as 
well as the abolishment of informal payments (Tambor et al. 2010). However the introduction 
of these fees was quite unpopular among the public and became a very sensitive political issue 
in these countries. In Slovakia and Hungary the political debate even led to the abolishment of 
these fees a few years after their implementation (Baji et al. 2011a).  
In this paper we review the role of cost-sharing in health care financing in the four 
countries and compare the existing cost-sharing practices for pharmaceuticals as well as 
experiences with co-payments for health care services covered by the social health insurance. 
We apply a framework suggested by Robinson (2002) to evaluate these practices from the 
aspect of efficiency, equity and public acceptance. 
The results might help to indentify the main challenges and risks of cost-sharing 
systems applied in the countries examined and to develop sustainable policies on cost-sharing. 
First, we present the health care systems of the countries examined, focusing on the structure 
of health care financing. Then, we examine the role of cost-sharing in health care financing 
and we review and evaluate the existing patient cost-sharing practices applied for 
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pharmaceuticals and health care services. Finally we draw a conclusion focusing on policy 
aspects. 
 
2. BACKGROUND - COMPARISON OF THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS 
 
2.1. Health care system  
 
The health care systems of the Central European countries, namely Hungary, Slovakia, Poland 
and the Czech Republic show similarities concerning the organization, financing and structure 
of their health care systems. All the four countries have mandatory health insurance systems 
funded by income-related social health insurance contributions.  
In Hungary and Poland health care is financed by single-payer health insurance funds, 
called National Health Insurance Fund (NHF) in Poland and National Health Insurance Fund 
Administration (NHIFA) in Hungary. In the Czech Republic and Slovakia financing is 
divided between more health insurance funds (Bryndova et al. 2009). In these countries, 
contributions are redistributed among the funds according to a risk-adjustment scheme based 
on age and gender. 
 
2.2. Health care expenditure 
 
Data on health care expenditure for the four countries are presented in Table 1 (% of health 
care expenditure as a percent of GDP, the health care expenditure per capita (USD PPP), the 
repartition of health care expenditure by financing agent and by function). In 2009 Total 
health care expenditure accounted for 7.4% of the GDP in Poland and Hungary, 8.2% in the 
Czech Republic and 9.1% in Slovakia. These ratios are below the OECD average (9.5%). In 
2009 total health spending per capita was the highest in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia 
(2,108 USD and 2,084 USD in PPP), and lower in Hungary and Poland (1,511 and 1,394 
USD) (OECD 2011). 
The share of public health care expenditure (financed by social insurance contributions 
and tax revenue of the government) from total health care expenditure was the highest in the 
Czech Republic (83%), while lower in Hungary (70%), Poland (72%) and Slovakia (69%), 
(see Table 1 and Figure 1). The four countries spent the major share of the resources on 
curative and rehabilitative health care services, 58% and 54% in Czech Republic and Poland, 
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and 46% in Hungary and 44% in Slovakia. The share of expenditure on medical goods was 
the highest in Hungary (37%) and in Slovakia (35%). 
 
Table 1 
Health care expenditure in four Central European countries 
 CZ HU PL SK 
Health care expenditure     
% of GDP 2009 8.2% 7.4% 7.4% 9.1% 
% of GDP 2008 7.1% 7.3% 7.0% 8.0% 
PPP (US $) 2009 2,108 1,511 1,394 2,084 
PPP (US $) 2008 1,781 1,437 1,213 1,770 
Repartition by financing agent 2009     
% of public  83% 70% 72% 69% 
% of OOP 15% 24% 24% 27% 
% of other private 2% 6% 2% 4% 
Repartition by function 2009     
Services of curative and rehabilitative care (%) 58% 46% 54% 44% 
Medical goods dispensed to out-patients 22% 37% 25% 35% 
Services of long-term nursing care 3% 4% 5% <1% 
Prevention and public health services 3% 4% 2% 5% 
Health administration and health insurance 3% 1% 1% 3% 
Ancillary services to health care 6% 4% 6% 7% 
Other (capital formation of health care providers) 5% 4% 7% 6% 
Source: Health Database 2011 
 
2.3. Health care reforms during the last decade - pressure on the public budgets  
 
In the last decade the four countries have been facing similar challenges, namely the 
continuous deficit of the health insurance funds, and financial problems of health care 
providers. The countries had similar attempts to deal with these problems and to stabilize 
social health insurance. The measures expected to solve financial problems mostly considered 
the changes of the financing mechanism and ownership of the providers (privatization), 
expansion of contribution payers, the introduction and increase of patient co-payments as well 
as changes in the system of pharmaceutical subsidies (Bryndova et al. 2009; Hlavačka et al. 
2004; Kuszewski – Gericke 2005; Rechel – McKee 2009). 
In Slovakia health care reforms in 2004 aimed to stabilize the financial situation of the 
health care system, control the deficit of the health insurance funds. Measurements aimed to 
control the utilization of health care services and consumption of pharmaceuticals with the 
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introduction of co-payments, the definition of the basic health insurance package and the 
regulation of health insurance funds (Hlavačka et al. 2004). 
In Hungary the continuous deficit of the NHIFA was one of the reasons for the 
Hungarian government to consider health care reforms as a part of the Convergence Program 
of Hungary in 2006. The main objective of this program was to contain the government 
deficit and meet the Maastricht criteria of the EU for joining the Euro zone (i.e. the ratio of 
the annual government deficit to gross domestic product must not exceed 3% at the end of the 
preceding fiscal year). Reform arrangements concerned the regulation, the structure and the 
financing of health care system including the expansion of contribution payers, the 
introduction of 1 Euro co-payments for physician visits and days spent in hospital, the change 
in pharmaceutical subsidies (decreasing public funding), the structural reform of in-patient 
care (the cut of acute bed capacity by 27%, the increase of chronic bed capacity by 31% and 
the establishment of the system of high priority and territorial hospitals) (Hungarian Republic 
2006; Vas et al. 2009).
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Reforms in the Czech Republic were carried out based on The Public Budget 
Stabilization Act in 2007 which included a variety of measures like the establishment of an 
annual ceiling on social health insurance contributions for all contributors, the introduction of 
co-payments for health care services and pharmaceuticals, and changes of the system of 
setting prices and reimbursement rates for pharmaceuticals (Bryndova et al. 2009).  
Health care reforms were carried out in Poland in 2003, when the National Health 
Insurance Fund replaced the regional sickness funds (Kuszewski – Gericke 2005). Recently, 
twelve health care related acts have been sent to public discussion. These bills consider 
changes in the drug financing, and pharmaceutical subsidy system, also health care provision - 
regulation would allow private health care funds to compete with the NHF from 2014 after a 
pilot period. Some of the bills have been already passed, while the others are still under 
discussions (Orlewska 2011). 
However in all the four countries financial deficits could be controlled only for short 
periods after the reform arrangements. The decrease of public resources, the financial 
problems of providers (especially hospitals) and low quality of health care services have still 
remained challenges for the health care systems (Bryndova et al. 2009; Hlavačka et al. 2004; 
Kuszewski – Gericke 2005; Rechel – McKee 2009). 
 
3. THE ROLE OF PATIENT COST-SHARING IN HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
                                                          
2 Also, see the relevant legislation at http://www.medimagister.hu/data/upload/docstore/TV06.CXXXII.pdf (in Hungarian). 
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The share of out-of-pocket payments
3
 (including official fees in a form of co-payments, 
payments for OTC drugs and for private services and also informal payments) in total 
expenditure is the highest in Slovakia (27%) in 2009, slightly lower in Hungary and Poland 
(24%) and significantly lower in the Czech Republic (15%), (see Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. Repartition of the health care expenditure;  
Source: Health Database 2011 
 
The share of out-of-pocket payments have been increasing continuously after the 
change of the communist regimes in the 1990’s, where health care costs were mostly covered 
by public resources (Figure 2). In Slovakia the dynamic increase of the share of out-of-pocket 
payments in total health care expenditure in 2004 might indicate the effect of financial 
reforms in 2003. Also, the effect of Public Budget Stabilization Act in 2007 in the Czech 
Republic is visible. 
 
 
                                                          
3 We have to highlight that according to the terminology of the OECD, out-of-pocket payments “comprise cost-sharing, self-
medication and other expenditure paid directly by private households.” Thus, this definition is broader than cost-sharing. See: 
http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1967 
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Figure 2. Out-of-pocket expenditure of the population 1990-2008 (% of total expenditure);  
Source: Health Database 2011 
 
In Hungary, Poland and Slovakia the share of out-of-pocket payments in total health 
care expenditure is relatively high compared to other OECD countries (Figure 3). The share of 
out-of-pocket payments in the Czech Republic is comparable to the OECD average. 
 
 
Figure 3. Out-of-pocket expenditure in OECD countries, 2008 (% of total expenditure) 
Source: Health Database 2011 *indicate data from previous years 
 
If we have a closer look at the repartition of out-of-pocket payments, we can observe 
that the main driver of these payments is the expenditure on pharmaceuticals and medical 
devices in the countries examined. The share of expenditure on pharmaceuticals and medical 
devices exceeds the 70% of the total out-of-pocket expenditure in Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia (Figure 4). While the share of out-of-pocket payments on health care services 
(physician visits and hospitalization) is minor. However the repartition of out-of-packet 
payments is more balanced in the EU15 countries. 
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Figure 4. Structure of out-of-pocket expenditure of the population.  
Source: Consumers in Europe, Eurostat 2009 
 
4. COST-SHARING PRACTICES IN THE FOUR COUNTRIES  
 
4.1. Cost-sharing for pharmaceuticals and medical devices 
 
In the examined Central European countries co-payments for commodities (e.g. 
pharmaceuticals and medical devices) have long been applied (Baji et al. 2011a; Rechel – 
McKee 2009; Tambor et al. 2010). We find converging cost-sharing techniques in the four 
countries (comparable to those in Western European countries): e.g. partial reimbursement 
(based on a co-insurance rate denoted as a % of the price of the drug or reference pricing), and 
all these countries apply fix co-payments for 100% reimbursed drugs. All countries apply 
reference pricing for prescription drugs – patients should pay the difference of the prices if the 
actual price of the drug exceeds the reference price. In the Czech Republic and Slovakia the 
partial reimbursement of pharmaceuticals is based mainly on reference pricing. In Hungary 
reference pricing is also used such as generic reference pricing and therapeutic reference 
pricing. In the following we review the application of these techniques. 
 
 The Czech Republic  
In the Czech Republic the pharmaceutical reimbursement system is mostly based on reference 
pricing. Thus, for prescription drugs, patients should pay the difference between the actual 
price and the reference price. In 2008 a flat co-payment of CZK 30 (~1.20 Euro) was also 
introduced for all prescription pharmaceuticals, thus patients should pay the difference 
between the reference price and the actual price of the drug or the 30 CZK (~€1.20) flat co-
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payment, whichever is greater. In practice, 57% of prescribed pharmaceuticals (in terms of the 
number of packs distributed) did not require any co-payment beyond the CZK 30 (€1.20) in 
2009 (Bryndova et al. 2009). In addition, in 2008 a ceiling was introduced for co-payments 
(5,000 CZK ~ 200 Euro) and patients, whose expenses (including co-payments for services as 
well as for pharmaceuticals) exceed this limit, are reimbursed for the additional co-payments 
by their health insurance fund (Bryndova et al. 2009).  
 
 Hungary 
For the vast majority of the prescribed drugs, patients are obliged to pay co-payments. The 
“Act on the secure and efficient supply of pharmaceuticals and medical aids and on the 
general rules of pharmaceutical trade” 4 adopted by Parliament in 2006 defines the current 
reimbursement categories for pharmaceuticals as well as the subsidy rates for drugs in each 
category. In the category of “indication dependent drugs” (physicians with a special permit or 
recognition are authorized to prescribe these medication) there are four subsidy categories: 
50%, 70%, 90% and 100% (for drugs for life-threatening chronic conditions and orphan drugs 
in selected indications), with the co-payments of 50%, 30% and 10% of the full price. For 
drugs which are 100% subsidized in the category of indication dependent drugs a 300 HUF 
(~€1.1) fix fee per box should be paid since 2007. Drugs belong to the category of “normative 
reimbursement” (i.e. drugs for chronic diseases, that all physicians are authorized to 
prescribe) patient co-payments account for 15%, 45% and 75% of the price. In addition to 
these categories reference pricing (both generic and therapeutic reference pricing) is also 
used, where the difference between the reference price and the actual price should be paid by 
the patients. In Hungary some patients with a special certificate have the right to get 
prescribed medicine for free, but the amount should not exceed a certain budget (max. 12,000 
HUF ~ 44 Euro) per months. Disabled persons and those persons are enabled for the 
certificate whose medical expenses exceed 10% of the minimum pension and the family 
income per person does not exceed the minimum pension (in 2010 around 100 Euro) or 150% 
in case if the person is living alone.
5
 
 
 Poland  
                                                          
4 Available at http://www.complex.hu/kzldat/t0600098.htm/t0600098.htm (in Hungarian). 
5For more details see 
http://www.oep.hu/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/LAKOSSAG/OEPHULAK_EBELLAT/ACH%C3%8DVUM%202010/KOZGYO
GYELLATAS.PDF (in Hungarian) 
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According to the new act
6
 on pharmaceuticals, a group of drugs will be guaranteed to be 
available without patient co-payments (e.g. drugs to treat malignant tumors with proven 
efficacy, psychiatric disorders and mental disabilities, developmental disorders, diseases 
posing a particular threat of epidemic, and those for use in therapeutic programs). Co-
payments of 50% are applied for drugs that require a course of treatment less than 30 days and 
co-payments of 30% are applied for drugs which require a treatment more than 30 days. For 
drugs where co-payments exceed a certain limit defined as a percentage of the average salary 
patients should pay only a small fixed co-payment (i.e. for drugs with co-payment of 30% if 
the monthly cost exceeds the 5% of the average salary, and drugs with co-payment of 50% if 
the monthly cost exceeds the 30% of the average salary in Poland), (Orlewska 2011). 
 
 Slovakia 
In Slovakia drugs are divided into three reimbursement categories. The first category consists 
of essential drugs (e.g. oncology, antibiotics, cardiovascular, respiratory, neurology, and some 
vaccines), which are fully reimbursed by the insurance funds. For 100% reimbursed drugs a 
fix co-payment of 5 SK (0.17 Euro) should be paid by the patients (approximately one-third 
of the reimbursed drugs are 100% reimbursed) (Szalay et al. 2011). Drugs in the second 
category are partially subsidized and drugs in the third category (drugs on negative list) 
receive no subsidy at all. In the partial reimbursement category co-payments are based on 
reference pricing, it is equal to the difference between the reference price and the price of the 
actual drugs (Kaló et al. 2008; Szalay et al. 2011). In Slovakia so far, there are no exemption 
categories for co-payments for pharmaceuticals. In 2011 it was planned to introduce a limit 
for expenditure for vulnerable social groups (a maximum limit of €45 quarterly for co-
payments on drugs for selected groups of insured), (Szalay et al. 2011). 
 
4.2.Patient payments for health care services 
 
During the communist period health care services were provided without patient co-payments 
in the four countries. After the change of the regimes, co-payments were intruded for some 
services (e.g. dental care, free choice of physician, hotel services like meal and room 
                                                          
6 Previously two reimbursement lists existed in Poland. For drugs on List A, the levels of reimbursement is related to the 
level of drug clinical use 100%, 70% or 50% with the co-payments of 30% and 50% of the full price. A fix fee equivalent of 
0.67% of the lowest salary in Poland (currently 3.20PLN ~ 0.77 Euro) per prescribed pack should be paid for 100% 
reimbursed drugs. For these expenses a limit is introduced, and the total amount spent on these co-payments should not be 
higher than a certain percent of the minimum salary in Poland. Drugs on List B are only for patients with chronic diseases 
with the reimbursement categories of 50% 70% and 100% with the same co-payments of 30% and 50%. 
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facilities), however the use of physician and hospital services remained free of charge. A few 
years ago Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic tried to introduce co-payments for using 
health care services (around 1-2 Euro per visit/day). However these implementations were 
rather unpopular among the public and in Hungary and Slovakia co-payments for health care 
services were even abolished after a few years of their introduction. In the Czech Republic co-
payments still exists, however the reduction of the measure and the expansion of exemptions 
are still on the top of policy agenda. Poland has not introduced co-payments for health care 
services yet, but this is a topic of policy discussion (Tambor et al. 2010). However regulations 
of the four countries define some services for which patient should pay co-payments – or 
exclude some services from the benefit package guaranteed by the social health insurance, in 
which case the full price of the service should be covered by the patients – the role of co-
payments/user fees in physician and hospital care remained minor in contrast to Western 
European countries. 
 
 The Czech Republic  
In the Czech Republic co-payments for health care services were introduced at the beginning 
of 2008, regulated by the Public Budgets Stabilization Act. The aim of the introduction of co-
payments was to reduce excessive utilization of services and generate additional revenue for 
the health care system (Bryndova et al. 2009; Eurohealth 2009a, Eurohealth 2009b). The fee 
was 30 CZK (€1.20) per physician visit, 60 CZK (€2.40) per day of hospitalization, 90 CZK 
(€3.60) per ambulatory visits. People living below the poverty line, neonates, chronically ill 
children, pregnant women, patients with infectious diseases, organ and tissue donors, and 
individuals receiving preventive services were exempted. Moreover, an annual ceiling of CZK 
5000 (~ 200 Euro) per person was also established for co-payments (not including co-
payments for hospital stays and ambulatory services outside of standard office hours). Above 
this limit further co-payments are reimbursed by the insurance funds (Bryndova et al. 2009). 
In February 2009 the government exempted children under the age of 18 from co-payments as 
well and for people over the age of 65 the maximum ceiling for co-payments were reduced 
from 5000 to 2,500 CZK (Bryndova et al. 2009; Eurohealth 2009a, Eurohealth 2009b). Co-
payments are also applied in dental care, where social insurance covers limited treatments, 
and only the least expensive options. Thus, most of the health care consumers choose to visit 
private dentists and cover the full price.  
 
 Hungary 
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Social health insurance provides physician and hospital services free of charge. Co-payments 
are charged only in case of the following services:  
- Dental care: for orthodontic treatment under the age of 18, for tooth keeping and 
replacement above the age of 18. 
- Free choice of physician (excluding delivery and maternity care). Patients should cover 
30% of the cost, maximum 100 000 HUF.  
- Using services without referral (excluding urgency care).  
- In-patient care: extra meal and accommodation for in-patient and sanatorium treatment, 
in-patient chronic care.  
 
However, in 2007 as a part of reform arrangements the government introduced co-payments 
for health care services, 300 HUF (~1.1 Euro) per visit and per day hospitalization. Children 
under the age of 18 were exempted. Also, users of certain health care services (e.g. emergency 
care, some chronic care/treatments, prenatal and preventive care) were exempted as well. A 
limit was introduced for the total amount of payments and defined in maximum 6,000 HUF 
(22.2 EUR) per year per service type. Limits were applied separately for GP, out-patient and 
in-patient care, the total amount of payment was limited at 15,000 HUF (55.5 EUR) per year. 
Patients had the right to ask for the reimbursement of their payments after 20 visits or 20 day 
spent in hospital per year. The beneficiary of the collected revenue was the provider 
institution (in case of primary care it means GP practices). The aim of the implementation was 
to make consumers cost-conscious and to regulate demand for public health care services, as 
well as to deal with the informal patient payments in Hungary (Ministry of Health 2006). 
However this “visit fee” was abolished shortly after its introduction in 2008 as a result of a 
population referendum. 
 
 Poland 
In Poland primary-out-patient and in-patient services are provided by the social health 
insurance without co-payments. Dental services which are available in the benefit package are 
restricted. The full cost of the dental services which are not guaranteed by social health 
insurance should be covered by the patients. Patients should pay co-payments in dental care, 
where children and pregnant women are exempted. Co-payments are used for the following 
services: 
- the costs of food and accommodation at chronic medical care homes, nursing homes, 
medical rehabilitation facilities, and sanatorium; 
14 
 
- the costs of travel to ambulances if there is no need for urgent treatment and to and from a 
sanatorium; 
- a flat price for diagnostic examinations. 
 
The level of co-payments is limited and depends on the income of the insured person, which 
is the main basis of the limitation (Kuszewski – Gericke 2005). However, there is a prolonged 
policy discussion on possible introduction of patient cost-sharing for health care services in 
addition to dental care but there is still no actual policy plans about the implementations 
(Tambor et al. 2010). 
 
 Slovakia 
In Slovakia social the health insurance system provides health care services in primary out-
patient and in-patient care. Co-payments should be paid only for emergency care services (70 
SK ~1.7 Euro per case), some dental services, and for provision-related services such as food, 
transport and hotel services. Slovakia also attempted to introduce co-payments for health care 
services in June 2003 with the aim to decrease unnecessary utilization of health care services 
and to deal with informal payments. The fee was 20 SKK per physician visit, 50 SKK per day 
of hospitalization, 60 SKK per ambulatory visits. Patients with chronic illnesses and some 
vulnerable groups were exempted. The system worked for three years, while in 2006 the new 
government came to power abolished co-payments for physician visits and hospital care 
(Pazitny-Szalay 2006; Schneider 2008). 
 
4.3. Informal payments  
 
However, we have to highlight that despite the fact that most of the health care services are 
provided without co-payments in Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, patients are regularly paying 
for health care services informally in these countries (Ensor 2004; Gaal et al. 2006; Lewis 
2000). These payments represent a significant share of the income of some health care 
personnel (Gaal et al. 2006). According to the literature patients pay informally to the medical 
personnel in the hope of getting care faster or with better quality. Other explanation of the 
origin and reasons of informal payments is based on culture and habit, and inherited 
experiences rooted in communist regimes (Bognár et al. 2000; Mihályi 2004; Gaal – McKee 
2005; Szende – Culyer 2006; TÁRKI 2007). 
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5. EVALUATION OF COST-SHARING PRACTICES 
 
We use the framework suggested by Robinson (2002) to evaluate cost-sharing practices of the 
four countries in terms of efficiency, equity and public acceptance. 
 
5.1. Efficiency  
 
In the context of the evaluation of cost-sharing policies, the interpretation of efficiency has 
several aspects. According to Robinson (2002) if the main aim of cost-sharing is to discourage 
‘unnecessary’ demand we can analyze the effect of cost-sharing on the utilization of services. 
However, the aim of cost-sharing might be also to generate revenue for funding health care 
when alternative funding (such as tax revenue) is not available. In this case we can examine 
whether the increase of cost-sharing reduces public expenditure on health. Considering the 
cost-sharing practices in the four countries, the introduction of co-payments for health care 
services rather meets the first objective, while the practice of cost-sharing for pharmaceuticals 
serve the second purpose and accounts for relevant resource for health care financing. 
The introduction of co-payments for health care services was motivated by the control 
of utilization in all the three countries. There is evidence in the literature that introduction or 
increase of co-payments decreases the utilization of health care (e.g. Manning et al. 1987; 
Newhouse 1997). We have similar experiences in the four countries as well after the 
introduction of a ‘1 Euro universal fee’. In Slovakia according to estimations in the second 
half of 2003, after the introduction of co-payments there was a 10% reduction in the number 
of out-patient visits compared to the same period in 2002 and also the number of emergency 
visits dropped by 13% (Pazitny and Szalay 2006; Schneider 2008). In Hungary the average 
monthly number of visits to GP’s decreased by 26%, out-patient visits decreased by 19% and 
the days spent in hospital by 15% (Boncz et al. 2008; Kőrösi et al. 2009; Nagy et al. 2008).7 
In the Czech Republic during the first year of the introduction of co-payments the number of 
emergency visits dropped by 36%, ambulatory specialist visits by 15% and ambulatory 
specialist visits in in-patient facilities by 19% (Kossarova 2008; Eurohealth 2009a; Eurohealth 
2009b). However there is a concern that the introduction of co-payments has an adverse 
equity effect as vulnerable social groups are more sensitive to price changes (e.g. Manning et 
al. 1987; Newhouse 1997).  
                                                          
7
 However we have to highlight that other changes concerning the referal and prescription system might also affect the 
utilization in Hungary,  
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In the case of pharmaceuticals and medical goods, relevant revenue is generated from 
co-payments. We can observe that the major part of the out-of-pocket payments of the 
households is co-payments for pharmaceuticals (more than 70%). Based on OECD data 
presented in Table 1 we can estimate that patient co-payments for pharmaceuticals and 
medical goods account for a relevant part of the health care expenditure spent on these items. 
Besides the objectives above, in the CEE countries the introduction of co-payments 
was also motivated by their potential to eradicate or formalize informal payments. However 
we have no clear evidence that the introduction of co-payments does not induce a double 
financial burden on health care users (Baji et al. 2011; Ensor 2004; Lewis 2000). 
 
5.2. Equity  
 
According to the main policy concepts of equity the need for health care should determine the 
amount of health care consumed by households and the ability to pay should determine 
payments for health care services. This implies that the use of services should not depend on 
the ability to pay, however the distribution of health care payments should be in line with the 
distribution of the household’s income (e.g. De Graeve – van Ourti 2003; Wagstaff – van 
Doorslaer, 1993). 
Concerning the first aspect, the literature suggests that co-payments might induce adverse 
effects on equity by decreasing the utilization of health care services for those who are not 
able to pay for them. This might lead to higher morbidity, emergency care admissions and 
mortality (Atella et al. 2005; Austvoll-Dahlgren et al. 2008).  
In the four countries the measure of cost-sharing is high especially in the case of 
pharmaceuticals. Thus, if the exemption mechanisms for vulnerable social groups are not 
adequate, the equity in access might be questionable. We can observe that the Czech Republic 
applies a ceiling for the total yearly amount of co-payments paid by a patient and in Poland 
co-payments for a certain medication cannot exceed a certain percentage of the average 
salary. However the role of protection mechanisms seems to be minor in Hungary and 
Slovakia. For co-payments for health care services all the three countries applies/applied both 
exemption of certain services or social groups and also a ceiling for these payments. However 
we have no information about the effectiveness of these protection mechanisms. For example 
in Hungary exemption categories were mostly formulated based on the type of care rather 
than the income situation of the patients. 
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As for the financial distribution of these payments out-of-pocket payments are a 
regressive means of financing health care (e.g. De Graeve – van Ourti 2003; Wagstaff – van 
Doorslaer, 1993). Thus, lower income households pay a relatively higher share of their 
income on health care than better-off households. The literature also suggests that in Hungary, 
Slovakia and Poland worse-off households spend relatively higher share of their income on 
health care as well (Hlavačka et al. 2004; Kuszewski et al. 2005). The situation might be 
better in the Czech Republic, where the share of out-of-pocket payments in health care 
financing is lower, and the burden is quite evenly distributed across households (Bryndova et 
al. 2009). 
 
5.3. Public acceptance  
 
The introduction of co-payments for health care services met strong political opposition and 
unpopularity among public in the countries examined. Co-payments for health care services 
become a very sensitive political issue and had an important role in policy discussions as well 
as in politics, which divided political parties (Baji et al. 2011a; Baji – Gulácsi 2010; Hall 
2009). In Hungary and Slovakia co-payments for health care services were even abolished 
after a few years of their introduction. In Slovakia the opposition party argued that user fees 
violate the constitutional right to free health care provision and asked for a constitutional 
inspection of this issue. The Constitutional Court ruled that user fees are in accordance with 
the Constitution. However, the government elected in 2006 abolished co-payments in 
accordance with their election campaign (Szalay et al. 2011). In Hungary the opposition party 
initiated a popular referendum, where more than 80% of the participants voted against co-
payments. This led to the abolishment of the payments in April 2008. In the Czech Republic 
co-payments still exist, however the reduction of the measure and the expansion of 
exemptions are still on the top of the policy agenda. The opposition party called for the 
complete abolition of all co-payments in their campaign at the regional elections in 2008. Due 
to this pressure, exemption categories were extended and the government reduced the 
maximum ceiling of the co-payments for the elderly as well (Bryndova et al. 2009; Eurohealth 
2009a; Eurohealt 2009b).  
However at the same time co-payments for pharmaceuticals have long been applied in 
these countries and seem to be more acceptable for the public, nevertheless these payments 
constitute the major share of household expenditure on health care. 
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6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS FOR POLICY MAKERS 
 
Our paper reviews the existing cost-sharing practices in the context of four Central European 
countries namely the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, focusing on patient co-
payments for pharmaceuticals and for medical services covered by the social health insurance. 
We examine the role of cost-sharing in health care financing, and the differences, and 
convergences of cost-sharing policies and evaluate them in term of efficiency, equity and 
public acceptance. We believe that our results might support policy making about patient 
payments in Central European countries. Our findings should contribute to establish 
sustainable cost-sharing policies acceptable for the public. 
The main conclusions of our study are summarized below: 
1) The share of out-of-pocket payments in health care financing is relatively high in Hungary, 
Poland and Slovakia (24-27%) compared to other OECD countries. However in the Czech 
Republic the share of out-of-pocket payments is significantly lower (15%). The main cost 
driver of out-of-pocket health care expenditure is expenditure on pharmaceuticals and medical 
devices, which accounts for more than 70% of these payments in Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia.  
2) We find that the four countries apply similar cost-sharing practices for co-payments for 
pharmaceuticals as well as for health care services. However we identify differences 
concerning the measure of exemption mechanisms for vulnerable social groups.  
3) We find that the introduction of co-payments for health care services leads to a significant 
decrease in the utilization of services, which might lead to unequal access for health care. The 
lack of protection mechanisms in the case of pharmaceuticals especially in Hungary and 
Slovakia might hurt the principles of equity. Furthermore, the introduction of co-payments is 
rather unpopular among the public and leads to political debates.  
Based on our findings we recommend some points concerning cost-sharing policies 
for further consideration: 
- Protection mechanisms in the case of out-of-pocket payments for pharmaceuticals and 
medical devices should be reconsidered especially in Hungary and Slovakia (i.e. the 
introduction of ceilings for co-payments for medicine and the expansion of exemptions for 
vulnerable social groups) to reduce negative effects of these payments on equity and 
access which might lead to higher morbidity.  
- It should be taken into consideration that the introduction of co-payments for health care 
services might lead to adverse equity effects. If co-payments are introduced, the 
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exemption mechanism for the vulnerable social groups should be carefully defined. 
However this might lead to difficulties in administrative processes and abuses. 
- Furthermore, the introduction of co-payments is a hot political issue. Thus, consensus 
among political parties and support of the public is inevitable for successful 
implementation. This requires open policy discussions and strong communication with the 
public. 
- When considering the introduction of co-payments for health care services the existence 
of informal payments should be taken into consideration. Thus, the introduction of co-
payments might induce a double financial burden for health care services. Policies which 
aim to formalize informal payments should consider the origin and the reason of these 
payments (e.g. patients might pay to get services with better quality and better access or 
personal attention) as well as the possibilities to compensate the beneficiaries of informal 
payments (otherwise this small group of physicians might have the power block health 
care reforms). 
- Other ways of increasing private resources (private insurance) should be also considered 
to be able to maintain the quality of health care services. From previous studies we know 
that some population groups are willing to pay for the improvement of health care services 
(Baji - Gulácsi 2010; Baji et al. 2011a). First of all, health care services guaranteed by the 
social health insurance for the whole population should be clearly defined as well as the 
quality standards of these services. However policies should be careful not to hurt the 
principles of equity. 
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